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THE U.S. NAVY’S TRANSITION TO JETS
Robert C. Rubel
Definition of an optimist: a naval aviator with a savings account.
QUIP POPULAR IN NAVAL AVIATION
As we approach 2011, the centennial year of aviation in the U.S. Navy, the jetengine and jet-powered aircraft have become ubiquitous. Today millions
travel safely in jet airliners, and the military jet fighter is almost a cultural icon.
However, in the late 1930s the prospect for powering aircraft with anything but
piston engines seemed remote, except to a few visionary engineers in Great Brit-
ain and Germany. In the early 1940s their work resulted in the first flights of
jet-powered aircraft, but due to the low thrust of their engines these aircraft were
outclassed by existing piston-engine fighters. Additional advances in engine de-
sign in Germany resulted in the fielding of the Me-262 Swallow fighter, which,
although not as maneuverable as the American P-51 Mustang or other Allied
fighters, had a top speed 100 mph faster, due to its jet engines and swept wings,
giving it significant operational advantages. After the
war, aeronautical engineers from all the Allied nations
studied German technical advances and worked to in-
corporate them into their new generations of fighters.
When the U.S. Navy introduced its first operational
jet, the McDonnell F1H Phantom, in 1947, it began
a transition phase that turned out to be extended and
very costly in terms of aircrew lives and airplanes
lost. The higher speeds and altitudes of jets presented
a new set of problems to the aircraft designers and
manufacturers, as well as to the Navy squadrons that
operated them. In 1946, nobody knew that a high-
performance jet fighter needed such appurtenances
as a stabilator (instead of an elevator); irreversible,
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hydraulic flight controls with artificial feel; redundant hydraulic systems; pitch
and yaw stability augmentation; ejection seats; air conditioning; and others.1
Learning these lessons required a trial-and-error process that resulted in the
fielding and rapid obsolescence of a series of different jets, each reflecting solu-
tions to the defects discovered in earlier models.
It is central to the story presented in this article to consider how long this
“transition” to jets lasted. Some histories of naval aviation regard the transition
to jets to be substantially complete with the phasing out of the last propeller-
driven fighter, the F4U Corsair, while others maintain that the transition lasted
until the introduction of the F-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom II—the first Navy
carrier-based fighters that were the equals of their land-based counterparts. An-
other way of looking at it is through the lens of safety: one might declare the
transition to have been complete when the Navy aviation accident rate became
comparable to that of the U.S. Air Force. The logic behind this reasoning is that
whereas a multitude of factors—technical, organizational, and cultural—con-
stitute the capability to operate swept-wing jets, the mishap rate offers an overall
indicator of how successful an organization is in adopting a new technology.
Using this criterion, the Navy’s transition process lasted until the late
1980s—which was, not coincidentally, the era in which the F/A-18 arrived in
the fleet in numbers. This article argues that tactical jet aircraft design and
technology presented Navy aircrews, maintenance personnel, and leaders with
several major challenges that were in fact not substantially overcome until the
introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet in 1983. These challenges included such
technical problems as engine reliability and response times, swept-wing flight
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characteristics, and man/machine interface issues. The Air Force also encoun-
tered these challenges, but the Navy’s operating environment and, indeed, its or-
ganizational culture kept it from achieving a fully successful transition until well
after the Air Force did.
Between 1949, the year jets started showing up in the fleet in numbers, and
1988, the year their combined mishap rate finally got down to Air Force levels,
the Navy and Marine Corps lost almost twelve thousand airplanes of all types
(helicopters, trainers, and patrol planes, in addition to jets) and over 8,500
aircrew, in no small part as a result of these issues. Perhaps the statistics for the
F-8 Crusader, a supersonic fighter designed by Vought in the late 1950s, provide
a good illustration of the problem. The F-8 was always known as a difficult air-
plane to master. In all, 1,261 Crusaders were built. By the time it was withdrawn
from the fleet, 1,106 had been involved in mishaps. Only a handful of them were
lost to enemy fire in Vietnam.2 While the F-8 statistics might have been worse
than those for most other models, they make the magnitude of the problem
clear: whether from engine failure, pilot error, weather, or bad luck, the vast ma-
jority (88 percent!) of Crusaders ever built ended up as smoking holes in the
ground, splashes in the water, or fireballs hurtling across a flight deck. This was
naval aviation from 1947 through about 1988. Today, the accident rate is nor-
mally one or less per hundred thousand hours of flight time, making mishaps an
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unusual occurrence. This is in stark contrast to the landmark year of 1954, when
naval aviation (that is, Navy and Marine combined) lost 776 aircraft and 535
crew, for an accident rate well above fifty per hundred thousand flight hours—
and the rate for carrier-based tactical aviation was much higher than that.
During this extended transition period, naval aviation participated in three
major wars and numerous crises, and, of course, many planes and crews were
lost to enemy fire. However, the vast majority of aircraft losses over this period
were due to mishaps, many of which were associated with the technical and or-
ganizational problems just mentioned. In other words, the airplanes that popu-
lated the flight decks of aircraft carriers from the introduction of the F1H
Phantom through the retirement of the F-14 Tomcat were, with few exceptions,
hard to fly and maintain and would kill the unwary crew. Many men and a few
women gave their lives trying to operate these machines in the challenging envi-
ronment of the sea. This history is meant to recognize their sacrifice and honor
their service.
THE OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVE
U.S. naval aviation ended World War II at the pinnacle of success; its propeller-
driven aircraft were the best in the world, and the requirements of carrier suit-
ability did not compromise their performance versus that of land-based fighters.
By the early 1940s the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics had received word of jet en-
gine developments in Germany and Great Britain and had commissioned West-
inghouse and Allis Chalmers to build American versions. However, the high fuel
consumption, low power at takeoff, and poor reliability of early engines did not
make them attractive for use in carrier-borne planes. Moreover, when details of
German aerodynamic advances, specifically the swept wing, became known,
Navy planners felt that high landing speeds and adverse handling characteristics
would make aircraft equipped with them unsuitable for carrier use.
On the other hand, the Navy was faced with a new opponent, the Soviet
Union, that had also capitalized on captured German knowledge. If the Soviets
were to build a high-speed jet bomber, carriers might be defenseless if they could
not launch high-speed interceptors from their decks. As the Cold War came into
being, this knowledge pressurized the development of jet aircraft, adding to the
rapidity with which it took place but also imposing brutal material and human
costs.
An additional source of pressure was the new U.S. Air Force, whose leadership
in the postwar environment believed that the combination of the atomic bomb
and the ultra-long-range bomber rendered naval aviation irrelevant. The Navy
had long regarded strikes against land targets to be a fundamental mission of its
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own air arm, and the prospect of being sidelined in the business of nuclear at-
tack seemed to threaten the very existence of naval aviation. In April 1949 the
secretary of defense, Louis Johnson, canceled the construction of USS United
States, a very large aircraft carrier that had been designed to support a new gen-
eration of big Navy jet bombers capable of carrying the large and heavy nuclear
weapons of the day. This cancellation, along with Air Force efforts to push the
huge B-36 bomber program at the expense of the other services, produced in
October 1949 an incident that has been termed the “Revolt of the Admirals.” Ad-
miral Arthur Radford and other aviation flag officers, as well as the Chief of Na-
val Operations (CNO), Admiral Louis Denfeld, testified before Congress
arguing the need for an atomic delivery capability for naval aviation and alleging
the deficiencies of the B-36—in direct contravention of the secretary of de-
fense’s wishes. Although Admiral Denfeld was subsequently fired by the
secretary, Congress was sufficiently convinced of the Navy’s utility in strike
warfare to authorize in 1951 the construction of USS Forrestal, the first of the
“supercarriers” that could adequately handle the heavy, fast jets. However, the
Navy still needed a jet to perform the mission of nuclear strike, and development
pressures continued.
The early Cold War operational environment was challenging for naval avia-
tion, to say the least. Knowing that the Soviet Union was working on jet fighters
and jet bombers that could carry nuclear weapons and drop them on naval for-
mations, the Navy needed to develop fighter/interceptor aircraft that could de-
fend the carrier and its escorts from attack while sailing into position to launch
its own strike, and also strike aircraft that had enough range to hit meaningful
targets and enough speed to survive enemy defenses. These general require-
ments propelled naval aviation development efforts from the late 1940s through
the 1970s. During this period, the actual employment of naval aviation in two
wars—Korea and Vietnam, as well as later in DESERT STORM—demanded of
Navy jets the flexibility to conduct conventional bomb delivery, close air sup-
port, and dogfighting. Thus carrier jets morphed over time to designs that were
more general in purpose, resulting ultimately in the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft
that is a true strike-fighter.
Thus there was no opportunity for naval aviation to rest on its laurels after
World War II. In combination with a massive postwar demobilization, it had to
forge ahead with a program to adopt the new engine and aerodynamic technol-
ogy. It attempted to reduce strategic risk, by letting multiple contracts to differ-
ent aircraft companies in hopes that at least one of the designs would be viable.
On the other hand, it accepted a high degree of operational risk, by ordering se-
ries production of various models before flight-testing was complete. The net
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effect of this strategy was that between 1945 and 1959 twenty-two Navy fighters
made their first flights, whereas over the following forty-six years only five did
so.3 Some of the designs spawned during the early period, such as the F2H Ban-
shee, were useful machines and had lengthy service lives, while others, like the
F7U Cutlass and F-11 Tiger, were disappointments and saw only brief service.
As mentioned previously, the first years of the jet era in the Navy were disas-
trous in terms of aircraft and crews lost, but the Navy had little choice but to con-
tinue sending jets to sea. The gas-guzzling nature of jets made getting them back
aboard the carrier in a timely manner a matter of utmost urgency and increased
the pressure on carrier captains, admirals, and their staffs to adapt to an opera-
tional tempo very different from what had been the norm. In 1950, a future vice
admiral, Gerald Miller, was on a carrier group staff operating F9F-2 Panthers in
Korea. On one occasion the group staff meant to swap sixty-four Panthers from
an outgoing carrier to one just coming into the theater. The weather was bad at
airfields ashore, and heavy seas were causing the flight decks to pitch. The staff
work and planning did not adequately take into account the limited endurance
of the new jet-powered aircraft. Miller’s description of what happened next il-
lustrates the consequences of learning to operate jets in a wartime environment:
We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried to bring them down and it was
a tough job of getting them on board. They were running out of fuel and there was
no base on the beach to send them to. We had to get them back on board those two
carriers, and we broke up those planes in some numbers.
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It was awful. It was so bad, I can still remember the admiral walking over to the op-
posite side of the bridge, putting his head down on his hands and shaking. It was so
bad he couldn’t even get mad. It was a horrible mess. Well, that was all because of the
size of the ship, the nature of the airplanes and straight deck operations. We started
from debacles of that kind to get something better.
Considering the upheaval in the navy caused by demobilization and the introduction
of new technologies, it’s amazing that we kept together as much as we did. . . . We
worried, but we did proceed with the jet program.4
At the same time that naval aviators were attempting to master the new jet air-
craft, they were also grappling with two new missions that increased the degree
of difficulty even more: night or all-weather operations, and nuclear weapons
delivery. In a sense, these two missions were connected, in that it was felt that
when the call came, weather or darkness must not be allowed to stand in the way
of getting the nuclear weapon to its target. These two missions exerted consider-
able pressure on aircraft design and on the risks naval aviation was willing to en-
dure to put these capabilities to sea. Coupled with the hazards inherent in
jet-powered aviation in those years, they significantly contributed to the loss of
aircraft. Gerald O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), describes the environment in Composite
Squadron Four (VC-4, based at Naval Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey), the
Navy’s East Coast night/all-weather fighter squadron in the early 1950s:
All naval aviators are routinely exposed to, or involved in, aircraft accidents. That’s
accepted as almost a hazard of the trade. In carrier work, where dangers abound, ac-
cidents tend to be more frequent. In the night carrier operations of those days, acci-
dents were so frequent that they were considered commonplace and unexceptional.
Whenever a det [detachment of four to six aircraft sent out on a carrier] departed,
the aircraft they flew off were more or less written off. No one expected that all of
them would ever come back to Atlantic City. . . . Unfortunately, the same negativism
tended to extend to the pilots as well, whose safe return wasn’t much better than the
aircraft. Between pilots lost, the pilots maimed, and the pilots who decided to throw
in their wings, precious few dets ever returned with the same resources they took
with them.5
NAVAL AVIATION CULTURE AND THE TRANSITION TO JETS
In order to understand the catastrophic price the Navy paid in its march to oper-
ate swept-wing jets from aircraft carriers, we must look at the organizational
culture onto which this new technology was grafted. After all, the majority of the
mishaps that occurred were due to aircrew errors of some sort, whether precipi-
tated or exacerbated by design problems or the result of gross error, negligence,
or irresponsibility not connected with design issues.
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Naval aviators always viewed themselves as daredevils. The difficulties of tak-
ing off from and landing on ships were unequaled in the land aviation domain,
and naval aviators therefore considered themselves exceptionally skilled—and
expendable. The accident rate (if not the sheer number of mishaps) in naval avi-
ation from its inception to World War II was hardly less than the awful rates ex-
perienced in the early jet era. Naval aviators always regarded themselves as a
different breed from their surface-ship brethren, but for all that they shared, and
still do, the Navy’s culture of independence and self-reliance. The simplicity and
relative inexpensiveness of early naval aircraft allowed this culture to thrive;
flight instruction was personal, and aviators had few detailed procedures or
rules to follow in mastering their aircraft. “Seat of the pants” flying and individ-
uality in technique were the orders of the day. Since piston-engine aircraft all op-
erated essentially in the same way and roughly at the same speeds, especially
when landing, and since they rarely flew at night or in bad weather, pilots could
transition between aircraft easily and informally. Mr. Richard “Chick” Eldridge,
a member of the Naval Safety Center staff for several decades, remembers his
Navy flight training in 1943: “To my recollection, there was little emphasis on
aviation safety. What safety information was imparted to the fledgling aviator
came from the primary instructors. Lessons learned usually came in the form of
‘gems of instructor wisdom.’ You were simply told to fly certain maneuvers in a
specific way or wind up as a statistic.”6
The first thing to change was the technology. Culture change lagged by more
than a decade, and the result was a virtual bloodbath. In addition to the specific
challenges of flying jets must be added greatly increased speeds. Things happen
much faster in jets, and a different mind-set and discipline are called for to avoid
disaster. Pilots who had spent a good deal of time operating at propeller-aircraft
speeds tended to have more difficulty adjusting to jet speeds than those who
were introduced to jets early. The author observed this during the Navy’s transi-
tion from the piston-engine S-2 Tracker carrier antisubmarine aircraft to the
jet-powered S-3 Viking. The more senior pilots seemed to have the most diffi-
culty, and indeed a number of them either quit, had accidents, or failed to pass
flight checks. This was a serious issue as well for the fleet introduction of the A-3
Skywarrior. Initially, in addition to carrier pilots, the Navy brought into the A-3
program senior aviators from the land-based patrol community. A series of acci-
dents and difficulties involving former patrol pilots prompted the commander
of the Sixth Fleet to write a letter to the CNO recommending that only carrier-
trained pilots be assigned to A-3 squadrons.7
In the early years of the jet transition, naval aviation remained wedded to its
individualistic culture. Structured programs of training, detailed reference
manuals, and disciplined evaluations of pilot performance did not exist in any
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coherent way across naval aviation. But jets, with their higher speeds, challeng-
ing handling characteristics, and ever more complex systems, required just that.
The horrible accident rates eventually drove the Navy to do something. Mean-
while, the Air Force, which had been suffering an increase in mishaps also,
formed a Flight Safety Directorate, with 525 personnel, and undertook to im-
pose discipline on the aviation corps by punishing crews after mishaps when
fault and culpability could be assigned. The Navy’s first effort at a flight-safety
agency was puny by comparison, with only twenty-five personnel. However, in
1953 a war hero, Captain James F. “Jimmy” Flatley, wrote a highly critical and in-
fluential report on naval aviation safety that generated organizational and pro-
cedural changes that in turn went far to change the culture.8 Along with them, a
more structured program of flight training was introduced, eventually culmi-
nating in the establishment of replacement training squadrons that provided in-
tensive and detailed instruction for newly “winged” aviators in the aircraft they
would fly in the fleet. These squadrons would also become centers of flight and
maintenance evaluation of fleet squadrons based with them. A variety of other
measures also served to professionalize and discipline the naval aviation culture,
including formal training for squadron safety officers, improved accident inves-
tigation techniques, specially trained medical personnel (called “flight sur-
geons”), the publication of a safety magazine to share stories of accidents and
near misses, and top-down leadership that countered the laissez-faire cultural
heritage.
However the “ready room” culture was resistant to change. Thus the authors
of a 1961 Naval Aviation News article felt compelled to say, “Some people view
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the idea of everyone in Naval Aviation doing everything ‘the one best way’ with
some misgivings. They fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it
may reduce the accident rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability to
‘think on his feet’ and deal flexibly with emergencies and combat situations. Ex-
perience in other fields has proved that fear unfounded.”9 A major element of
the resistance to change was the fact that adaptation to the new technology had a
value content—that is, it made irrelevant certain skill sets that had been associ-
ated with being a “good” aviator. The issue was not so much the difficulty of
learning new skills as reluctance to abandon old ones that were associated with
professional virtue. The naval aviation culture that had grown up from 1911 to
1947 was intense, parochial, and value-centric. Moreover, likely because of the
acrimonious relationship that developed between the two services in the late
1940s, there was a reluctance to view anything the Air Force did as appropriate
for naval aviation.
The Navy has always placed considerable responsibility and authority in the
hands of the individual officer. An imperative of war at sea, this delegated style
of command and control has both enhanced and afflicted U.S. naval aviation.
Throughout its history, outstanding decision making by relatively junior offi-
cers has made the difference in battle, such as when, during the battle of Midway,
Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky decided, in the air, to take his strike
group in the direction a Japanese destroyer was headed and thus found the en-
emy aircraft carriers. Faced in the 1940s and ’50s with new technology that de-
manded new types of procedural discipline and centralized management, the
culture was slow to adapt, and many naval aviators lost their lives as a result.
FINDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF INGREDIENTS
The development of aviation technology between the Wright brothers’ first
flight and 1947 was amazingly fast. In just forty-five years aviation progressed
from machines that were hardly more than powered kites to jets that pushed the
speed of sound. This rapid development meant that individual models of com-
bat aircraft became obsolete fairly quickly. This had been the case prior to and
during World War II, and it was to be the case over the early years of jet transi-
tion in the Navy. The initial echelon of straight-wing jets had an operational life
span in the fleet of only a few years, although some of them had longer, second
lives in the reserves or specialized shore-based uses, such as in training com-
mands. In the late 1940s and the early ’50s, as whole squadrons transitioned
from propeller airplanes to jets, pilots who had developed habits molded to
straight-wing propeller planes that were slower, lighter, and simpler and burned
fuel more slowly were put into fast, gas-guzzling jets. It was a lethal
combination.
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As the centennial of naval aviation approaches, it is interesting to observe that
it has been jet powered for over half of its history. The transition was long and
brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft. However, it was, by any measure, a
success. Throughout the Cold War and a series of hot wars—Korea, Vietnam,
DESERT STORM, and others—naval aviation has been able to provide effective
tactical airpower from the sea. Its ability to do this despite a long and difficult
process of learning how to operate jet aircraft at sea is a tribute to the brilliance
of various aircraft designers, the ingenuity of countless “airdales,” the sailors
who struggled to keep those complex and touchy machines flying, and the brav-
ery (and perhaps foolhardiness) of the crews who would climb into jets that
were hard to fly and lacked reliability and in those aircraft perform missions that
took them to the edge of what man and machine could do.
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